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Abstract
In this paper we use the concept of distributable surplus, introduced by Allais
(1943) and Luenberger (1992), to evaluate the capacity of European countries to
repay their debts. We first show that the surplus generated between 2005 and 2009
was not sufficient to cover the 2009 deficit for Greece, Ireland, Spain and the UK.
In order to generate a surplus equal to the 2009 deficit, these countries would have
had to reduce their initial well-being. Assuming that no reduction of well-being
is acceptable by the community, we use Computable General Equilibrium (CGE)
models to simulate different policies that can be implemented in order to generate
sufficient surplus. We show that the results are very sensitive as to whether we
consider deficits before and after the recent financial and economic crises. Then,
assuming that governments are able to capture all the distributable surpluses, we
compute the date at which they are able to repay their debts. We find that most
EU countries, excepted Germany and to lesser extent France and the UK, cannot
achieve debt sustainability. We finally discuss the usefulness of Eurobonds.
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1 Introduction
Over the years European governments have built huge public debts. With the recent
economic crisis the deficits have reached unprecedented levels as it seemed necessary
to support the economy with expansionary fiscal policies as, for instance, the financial
support to the French automobile industry.
The question arises as to whether European governments will be able to repay their
debt or whether they will have to resort to inflationary measures, or explicit default.
Governments need the cooperation of taxpayers to be able to levy enough taxes to repay
their debts. However, if taxes are too high, people could modify their behavior by reducing
labor supply and by transferring capital offshore, implying that the State will not be able
to levy enough taxes. So, it is not possible, as often advocated in the popular press, to
simply take money from the relatively wealthy.
The idea of our paper is that only surpluses can be taxed away by governments.
Surplus can be loosely defined as the difference between the maximum price a buyer
is willing to pay and the minimum price a seller is willing to accept for any trade. In
the absence of public intervention, the surplus is shared by the buyer and the seller
according to their bargaining power. The government can potentially take the entire
surplus generated by the transaction but not more as the buyer and/or the seller would
get less than their reservation price and would then withdraw from trade. Because of its
excessive greediness, the state would dry out the source of income on which it draws.
The surplus indicates the maximum amount that is taxable by the State. We will
assume here that governments are able to tax all surpluses even if, in practice, the effective
amount that can be extracted depends on the available fiscal tools as well as on the
information available to the State. The specific concept of surplus that is used in our
paper is that of the distributable surplus proposed by Allais (1943, 1981) or, equivalently,
of the benefit function proposed by Luenberger (1992a, 1995). In particular, Allais and
Luenberger define surplus as the maximum quantity of a reference good that can be
taken away from a consumer with a given level of utility. Hence, the reservation price
interpretation when the reference bundle is a unit of gold.
The aim of our paper is to evaluate, using the concept of distributable surplus, the
amount of surplus that can be extracted from European economies in order to investigate
whether their public spending/debts are sustainable. In particular, given that the dis-
tributable surplus represents the maximum taxable output that governments can extract
from their respective taxpayers, we compute the maximum level of debt that governments
can afford and determine the date at which governments are able to repay their debts.
Our results show that most EU countries, except Germany and to a lesser extent France
and the UK, cannot achieve debt sustainability.
It is important to note that the methodology used in our paper differs from that of
previous studies. Public debt sustainability has been empirically tested by assuming that
past behavior of fiscal policies remains constant. Hamilton and Flavin (1986) propose a
framework for analyzing whether governments can run a Ponzi scheme and find evidence
of the sustainability of the US public debt. A number of studies have tested the sustain-
ability of public deficits by analyzing the stationarity and the cointegration properties of
total public expenditures and revenues as ratios of GDP. Concerning European countries,
Bravo and Silvestre (2002) assume that the cointegration of expenditures and revenues
is a sufficient condition for sustainability and find that the fiscal policy is sustainable
in Germany, the UK, Austria, France and the Netherlands, but not in Belgium, Den-
mark, Ireland, Portugal, Italy and Finland. Greiner et al. (2007) find that fiscal policies
in some European countries are sustainable following the approach developed by Bohn
(1995, 1998) implying that the intertemporal budget constraint of the government holds
in the case in which the public debt to GDP ratio is a mean-reverting process.
The paper is organized as follows. In the following section we define distributable
surplus with Allais’ (1943) and Luenberger’s (1992b) benefit function and Boiteux’ (1951)
distributable income function. In section 3, we investigate whether European countries
have generated sufficient surplus during the period 2005-2009 that would have enabled
to cover their public deficits. In section 4, we simulate different macroeconomic policies
that governments could implement in order to create sufficient distributable surpluses.
In section 5, we analyze the sustainability of the European public debts. We conclude in
the last section.
2 Distributable surplus
Consider an economy composed of two consumers j = 1, 2 and two goods i = 1, 2.
Individuals have the following utility function Uj(xj) = Uj(x
1
j , x
2
j) =
∏
i(x
i
j)
αij with α1j +
α2j = 1 and they are endowed with the bundle of goods ωj = {ω1j , ω2j}.
Let g ∈ <2+ be an arbitrary reference bundle of goods and uj a reference utility level
which represents the minimum utility level acceptable for the individual j. We can define
the distributable surplus relative to the reference utility uj and the bundle of good xj as:
bj(xj, uj) = max
β
β s.t. uj(xj − βg) ≥ uj (1)
In words, the distributable surplus represents the maximum number of units of bundle
g that the consumer j is ready to give up to obtain bundle xj when his initial utility level
is uj. If g is a unit of gold, then bj(xj, uj) can be interpreted as the maximum price
that the agent will agree to pay in order to acquire xj given his utility level uj. Hence,
bj(xj, uj) can be interpreted as the reservation price of xj for individual j when one of
the goods is gold and is used as the nume´raire.
In the case of the above Cobb-Douglas utility function, for g = (1, 0), the distributable
function is given by:
bj(x, u) = x
2
j −
(
uj
(x1j)
α1j
) 1
α2
j
Alternatively, it is possible to use Boiteux’ surplus function to evaluate the total
distributable surplus in the economy. Boiteux’ (1951) and Courtault et al. (2008) present
an analogue of the benefit function in the dual space of price-income pairs, ranked with
the agent’s indirect utility functions vj. Agent j’s Boiteux’ surplus at utility level uj,
relative to the price-income pair (p, Rj), is defined by:
d(p, Rj, uj) = min
d
d s.t. vj(p, Rj + d) ≥ uj (2)
The Boiteux’ distributable income function d(p, Rj, uj) measures the level of income
that must be given to an individual to move from a reference utility level uj to an
environment (p, Rj). The Boiteux’s distributable income function, defined in terms of
income, is more intuitive than the benefit function which is defined in terms of an arbitrary
bundle of goods. In the case of the Cobb-Douglas utility function, the distributable
income function is given by:
d(p, Rj, uj) = Rj − uj ·
∏
i
(
pi
αij
)αij
(3)
It is often advocated that inflation represents an effective tool that can be used to
reduce public debt. However, supposing for simplicity that all prices increase at the
same rate and real GDP remains constant (which implies that the growth rate of the
nominal GDP coincides with the inflation rate), equation 3 shows that inflation permits
to increase distributable surplus only if the reference utility of the representative agent
remains unchanged (or grows at a lower rate than prices).
In Appendix 1 we determine the distributable surplus in a 2x2 pure exchange economy.
In particular, we compute the equilibrium of this economy and we deduce the total
maximal distributable surplus using both the Allais’ and Boiteux’ measures that can be
extracted from this economy. This distributable surplus is computed using as reference
utility level for each consumer the initial utility given by initial endowments, as this
represents the minimum utility level that an individual achieves if he chooses not to
trade.
3 Have European economies generated sufficient
surpluses?
In this section we use CGE models1 for seven European countries (France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom) in order to quantify the dis-
tributable surplus that European governments can extract from their taxpayers. The
models are calibrated using the 2005 input-output tables provided by OECD and other
macro data concerning national accounts. In order to take into account the effects of
the recent crisis on the possibility of surplus extraction, the CGE models are also cali-
brated using the 2009 data from national accounts and assuming the same structure for
input-output. It is important to note that in CGE models the observed situation repre-
sents the equilibrium of the economy. Hence, the initial equilibrium allocation in CGE
models is already Pareto-optimal as the first welfare theorem always holds in the absence
of externalities and market frictions. However, fiscal policies or other macroeconomic
shocks can change the equilibrium of the economy. Thus, the model allows to compute
the distributable surplus that is generated by a shock. This will permit us, in the next
section, to quantify the surplus generated by different policies.
1CGE models, introduced by Shoven and Whalley (1984) are widely used for fiscal analysis (see for
example Bettendorf et al., 2010), agricultural and environmental analysis (see for example Valenzuela
et al., 2007), and international trade analysis (see for example Francois et al., 2005), in order to assess
the economic consequences of a policy or a deterministic shock in a coherent framework that takes into
account the interrelations between economic agents (firms, households, government, and the rest of the
world). In Appendix 2 we present a description of the CGE models used in our analysis.
In order to compute the surplus, it is first necessary to choose a reference utility level
which represents the minimum utility level that households will accept. Two choices are
possible: to fix the reference utility either at the 2005 utility level or at 2009 utility level.
In the first case, we are able to conclude whether there was enough surplus in the economy
to cover the 2009 deficit, or whether it would have been necessary to cut spending. We are
also able to compute the reduction of well-being necessary to generate sufficient surplus
when the reduction in public spending is not politically feasible. In contrast, the second
case, where the 2009 utility level is used as reference utility, implies that no reduction of
well-being is acceptable by the community. Hence, we analyze in the next section whether
the governments are able to generate surplus through the introduction of a policy reform
aiming to increase real GDP.
Here, we assume that the reference utility level is fixed at the 2005 level, i.e. before
the crisis. In particular, we examine whether the economies have generated sufficient sur-
pluses during the period 2005-2009 to cover public deficits for the same period. Surpluses
are sufficient when the quantity of surplus generated by each economy is greater than or
equal to the actual deficit.
In table 1 we first present for each country the level of the surplus generated in 2009
with reference utility 2005 and the 2009 public deficit. Then we present the percentage
change in consumption between 2005 and 2009 and the percentage change in consumption
that would have been compatible with budgetary equilibrium, i.e. to generate sufficient
surplus. Our analysis shows that the surplus generated between 2005 and 2009 was not
sufficient to cover the 2009 deficit for Greece, Ireland, Spain and the UK. For instance,
Greece and Ireland generated a surplus equal respectively to 7.6% and 8.9% of GDP while
their deficits were 15.4% and 14.3% of GDP. In order to generate a surplus sufficient to
cover the 2009 deficit, it would be necessary to reduce the initial well-being (measured
by the disposable income devoted to consumption) by 11.8% in Greece, 13.3% in Ireland,
13.4% in Spain, and 9.2% in the UK. Indeed to sustain such level of the deficit, Greece
and Ireland would have to accept a level of disposable income which is respectively 11.8%
and 13.3% lower than the 2005 level and that corresponds to the 2002 level. This table
clearly shows that some countries have increased their level of consumption between 2005
and 2009 (Greece +9.2%, Ireland +3.1%, Spain +2.4%, and the UK +1.1%) even though
they should have reduced it drastically. France has increased its consumption over and
above the feasible level, while Italy has slightly decreased consumption as necessary. In
contrast, Germany has increased consumption well below what they could have done.
In the second part of table 1 we carry out the same analysis by considering the
cumulative deficit for the 2005-2009 period. Germany is the only country that could
have been able to repay while maintaining the 2003 well-being level. Most of the other
countries should accept a strong reduction of their well-being at a level comparable to
their early 1990 level. Our analysis shows that each government could have extracted
more surplus each year instead of running deficits, but they did not. Consequently, they
have to repay past deficits with current surpluses.
Table 1: Analysis of the Capacity of the EU Countries to Cover Public Deficits
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
France 8.0% 7.5% 5.1% 1.2% 2005-2006 18.7% -21.2% 1994
Germany 7.1% 3.0% 1.8% 8.2% >2010 7.5% -0.4% 2003
Greece 7.6% 15.4% 9.2% -11.8% 2002 42.5% -53.1% <1980
Ireland 8.9% 14.3% 3.1% -13.3% 2002 17.0% -13.3% 2002
Italy 5.1% 5.4% -0.3% -0.3% 2005 17.3% -22.8% 1998
Spain 4.0% 11.1% 2.4% -13.4% 2001 10.4% -12.4% 2001
UK 5.8% 11.4% 1.1% -9.2% 2001 25.2% -33.1% 1993
(1) Surplus 2009 (reference utility 2005)/GDP (2009);
(2) Deficit (2009) / GDP (2009);
(3) % actual variation of consumption wrt 2005;
(4) % variation of consumption with respect to 2005, compatible with budget equilibrium;
(5) Year at which budget equilibrium is achieved;
(6) Cumulative deficits 2005-2009 / GDP (2009);
(7) % variation of consumption with respect to 2005, 2005 compatible with budget equilibrium;
(8) Year at which budget equilibrium is achieved.
4 Simulation results of different macroeconomic
policies on distributable surpluses
In this section we consider the case in which people do not accept any reduction of
their well-being and we analyze the policies that governments could implement in order
to generate sufficient surpluses. Indeed, we are entitled to consider that the reference
utility level of agents is equal to the utility level that they achieved in the absence of the
policies under consideration. In fact, given that the government is free to choose whether
to introduce or not these policies, it can decide to capture all the surpluses that these
policies can generate.
The analysis is carried out by using the CGE models presented in Appendix 2. The
initial equilibrium used to calibrate our models gives us the reference utility level. Starting
from this level, a macroeconomic shock or policy moves the economy out of the initial
equilibrium and will allow us to compute the surplus generated by such a shock.
The effects are analyzed using five fiscal rules. In particular, in the first fiscal rule, the
government deficit and the income tax rate are exogenous, while the total government
expenditure is endogenously determined in order to satisfy the budget constraint. In the
second fiscal rule, the government deficit is exogenous, the total government expenditure
per worker is kept constant and the income tax rate is endogenously determined in order
to satisfy the budget constraint. In the third fiscal rule, the ratio between the government
deficit and GDP is fixed at the initial level, the income tax rate is exogenous and the
total government expenditure is endogenously determined in order to satisfy the budget
constraint. In the fourth fiscal rule, the ratio between the government deficit and GDP is
fixed at the initial level, the total government expenditure is exogenous and the income
tax rate is endogenously determined in order to satisfy the budget constraint. In the
fifth fiscal rule, the total government expenditure and the income tax rate are exogenous,
while the government deficit is endogenously determined in order to satisfy the budget
constraint.
Here we quantify the surplus generated by a policy aiming to increase real GDP.
Given that CGE models are supply-driven, the only way that permits to increase real
GDP is by increasing the quantity of labor and/or capital available in the economy. In
our simulations we consider a shock on both labor and capital supply. These shocks may
be interpreted as government policies. An increase in the labor supply may be induced,
for instance, by an immigration policy, an increase in the retirement age, or an increase in
the legal number of work hours per week. An increase in capital supply may be induced,
among others, by policies stimulating foreign investments or the repatriation of domestic
capital invested abroad. Some of the fiscal rules considered in our simulations permits to
consider the cost of these policies. For instance, an immigration policy requires an increase
in expenditures (health, education, infrastructures) which is explicitly taken into account
by the second fiscal rule in which the per capita public expenditure is kept constant.
The objective of our simulations is to compute, for each country and for the five fiscal
rules, the percentage increase in both labor supply and capital supply that is necessary
to generate a surplus sufficient to cover the 2009 public deficit. The results are reported
in Table 2.
Table 2: Percentage Increase in both Factors Necessary to Cover the 2009 Deficits
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th Average
Germany 6.2 5.0 6.6 5.1 4.9 5.6
Italy 11.0 8.7 12.6 8.8 8.5 9.9
France 15.4 13.8 18.3 14.1 13.6 15.0
UK 23.5 19.5 31.3 19.8 19.2 22.7
Spain 23.2 20.9 30.9 22.0 20.3 23.5
Greece 21.3 24.6 27.6 24.7 24.7 24.6
Ireland 36.8 35.5 58.9 39.7 35.0 41.2
Table 2 shows that only Germany appears to have maintained its capacity to generate
enough surplus to cover the deficit, whereas all the other countries have seen their situ-
ation drastically deteriorated. Indeed, a simple average across fiscal rules shows that for
Germany an increase of 5.6% of both labor and capital is sufficient to generate a surplus
equal to the deficit. For all the other countries, the percentage shock over both labor and
capital is much higher, with a maximum average of 41.2% for Ireland. Countries may
be ranked in ascending order according to their difficulty to get out of the public deficit
dilemma: Germany with 5.6%, Italy with 9.9%, France with 15%, the UK with 22.7%,
Spain with 23.5%, Greece with 24.6% and Ireland with 41.2%.
The media have particularly stressed the difficulty for Greece to repay its debt whereas
its situation is not much worse than that of Spain and, surprisingly, the UK. The situation
of Ireland seems catastrophic. This result is only partially explained by the value of the
deficits which are different in each country. Even if the public deficit of Greece is more
important than that of Ireland, the percentage increase in production factors to cover the
deficit is smaller.
The third fiscal rule seems to be the worst rule to generate a surplus sufficient to
cover the deficit. For all countries, except Greece, the best fiscal rule is the fifth, i.e. the
case in which public deficits are endogenous. This result implies that a Maastricht rule
type is not suitable during crisis and a more permissive budgetary policy seems more
appropriate.
5 Sustainability of public debts
In this section we compute for each country, in the case where no policy reform is imple-
mented, the year at which the total sum of the actual public debt and the present value
of future public deficits is offset by the present value of future distributable surpluses.
Public debt is defined as sustainable only in the case in which the date computed exists.
In our analysis we make the following assumptions: for each country, (i) the ratio of
public deficit with respect to GDP decreases linearly over time towards zero between 2012
and 2020; (ii) real GDP and distributable surpluses grow at the constant rate of 1.5%,
which implies that, given equation 3, the reference utility also grows at the constant rate
of 1.5%.
In the computation of the present values, we consider four different interest rates.
The first one is the ten-year government bond rate observed on November 9, 2011.2 This
interest rate is relevant when the entire public debt has to be renewed at that date.
However, if the time to maturity of the debt is not immediate, this interest rate is not
relevant. This is why, secondly, we consider the average ten-year government bond rate
observed in 2011 and, thirdly, the current yield interest rate computed as the ratio between
actual interests payments and the actual public debt. Finally, we consider the average
ten-year government bond rate observed in the Euro zone weighted by the size of public
debts. This rate is interesting because it could approximate the rate on Eurobonds in
the case in which European governments decide to introduce this kind of instrument to
finance the overall European debt.
Table 3 shows that, for any interest rate scenario, only France, Germany and the
UK are able to repay their current public debt using future surpluses generated by their
economies. If we consider the interest rate observed on November 9, 2011 (first scenario)
Greece, Italy, Ireland and Spain are not able to repay their debts within a finite horizon.
If we consider the average 2011 interest bond rate (second scenario) the public debt is
not sustainable for Greece and Ireland, while for Italy and Spain the date computed is
so far in the future that we can have doubts on the sustainability of their debts. If we
consider the current yield and the Eurobond scenarios (third and fourth scenarios) the
public debt is sustainable for all countries. However, the third scenario is not realistic as
financial markets are not willing anymore to lend to most European countries on the basis
of past interest rates at which the debt was contracted. It is interesting to note that in
the Eurobond scenario the date computed is delayed, with respect to the second scenario,
only for France and Germany and by only two years. However, even this scenario is not
very realistic since for Greece, Ireland, Italy and Spain the date is so far in the future
implying a strong uncertainty concerning the validity of our hypotheses over such a long
period.
2This date is chosen in our analysis as it is one of the worst period in the history of the Euro zone in
terms of high interest rates for most of highly indebted countries, such as Italy, Spain and Greece.
Table 3: Analysis of the Sustainability of Public Debts
(1) (2) (3) (4)
France Interest rate 3.16% 3.32% 2.76% 4.66%
Year 2026 2026 2025 2028
Germany Interest rate 1.81% 2.74% 3.52% 4.66%
Year 2021 2023 2023 2025
Greece Interest rate 30.69% 16.66% 4.20% 4.66%
Year never never 2049 2055
Italy Interest rate 8.24% 9.87% 2.90% 4.66%
Year never never 2043 2061
Ireland Interest rate 6.76% 5.14% 3.60% 4.66%
Year never 2096 2049 2067
Spain Interest rate 5.71% 5.40% 2.80% 4.66%
Year never 2136 2043 2064
UK Interest rate 2.35% 3.13% 2.51%
Year 2034 2037 2035
Source: Ecowin, November 2011.
(1) Beyond yield on November 9, 2011;
(2) Average bond yield in 2011;
(3) Interests/Public debt;
(4) Average bond yield in 2011 weighted by the size of public debts.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we use the concept of distributable surplus proposed by Allais (1943) and
Luenberger (1992a) to investigate on (i) the capacity of European governments to generate
sufficient surpluses to cover public deficits and (ii) the sustainability of public debts.
After showing that European governments have not generated sufficient surplus with
their economic policies implemented over the recent period (2005-2009), we investigate
whether a policy aiming at increasing both labor and capital supply could be sufficient to
cover actual deficits. Using CGE models for several European countries, we show that,
except Germany, public deficits observed in 2009 could be covered only by very large
increase in both labor and capital supply. In particular, the current public spending
cannot be financed by taxing the distributable surplus as the level of the increase in labor
and capital necessary to achieve the budget equilibrium is not realistic. Thus, European
governments will have to reduce their public spending at least to the level observed before
the crisis.
Concerning the sustainability of public debts in the Euro zone, which is necessary for
the preservation of the Euro system, we find that the best solution is the introduction
of Eurobonds. However, even this scenario is not very realistic since for Greece, Ireland,
Italy and Spain the date at which the debt is completely repaid is so far in the future
that it raises doubts on the effectiveness of this policy. In any case, the introduction of
Eurobonds would imply the strict control of public expenditures of the different European
countries by European institutions in order to maintain the debt under control.
Finally, it is important to note that these results are obtained by considering as
the reference utility the utility level achieved by households before these policy reforms.
Consequently, most European households will have to reduce their reference utility in
order to unable the governments to extract more surpluses from their policies. This
situation is analogous to the case of workers who have to accept a reduction in their
wages in order to keep their jobs. Politicians have to convince citizens that their current
well-being is no longer sustainable.
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Appendix 1
An illustration with a 2x2 pure exchange economy
Here, we present numerical simulations within a 2x2 pure exchange economy in which
the economy is supposed to be composed by two consumers j = 1, 2 and two goods
i = 1, 2. Consumers have the following utility function Uj(xj) = Uj(x
1
j , x
2
j) =
∏
i(x
i
j)
αij
with α1j +α
2
j = 1 and they are endowed with the bundle of goods ωj = {ω1j , ω2j}. We also
assume that there exists one unit of each type of good.
The following tables present, for a specific reference bundle, the effect of varying
elasticities of the Cobb-Douglas utility function with respect to each good and the effect
of varying the initial distribution of endowments, on the value of the distributable surplus
expressed as the percentage of the total equilibrium value of income.
Firstly, we can see that the results are not affected by the choice of the reference
bundle. Indeed, results are perfectly symmetrical when the reference bundle is g = (0, 1)
instead of g = (1, 0). In addition, when we use income as nume´raire, the results are
qualitatively similar. It is possible to note that when the elasticity with respect to one
good is exactly equal to the initial endowment in that good for any agent, then the
distributable surplus, however measured, is nil as the initial distribution is already Pareto-
optimal. Hence there is no incentives to trade (see for example Bewley, 2007, chapter 3).
Moreover, the results show that the farther is the initial distribution from the Pareto-
optimal allocation, the greater is the value of the distributable surplus that can be taxed
by the government.
Table A.1: Distributable surplus (% of income) with reference bundle g = (0, 1)
α11 α
1
1 α
1
1
——————————– ——————————– ——————————–
α12 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.25 0.50 0.75
ω12 = 0.25 ω
1
2 = 0.25 ω
1
2 = 0.25
ω21 = 0.75 ω
1
2 = 0.50 ω
1
2 = 0.25
0.25 9.93 2.97 0.00 2.61 0.00 2.74 0.00 2.39 8.50
0.50 23.99 12.50 2.91 11.48 3.33 0.00 2.46 0.00 2.45
0.75 30.58 20.04 8.64 17.99 9.57 2.37 6.89 2.22 0.00
ω12 = 0.50 ω
1
2 = 0.50 ω
1
2 = 0.50
ω21 = 0.75 ω
1
2 = 0.50 ω
1
2 = 0.25
0.25 2.48 0.00 2.66 0.00 3.29 11.09 2.48 11.24 21.26
0.50 11.24 3.33 0.00 3.29 0.00 3.21 0.00 3.33 10.99
0.75 21.26 10.99 2.50 11.09 3.21 0.00 2.66 0.00 2.50
ω12 = 0.75 ω
1
2 = 0.75 ω
1
2 = 0.75
ω21 = 0.75 ω
1
2 = 0.50 ω
1
2 = 0.25
0.25 0.00 2.46 6.89 2.61 11.48 17.99 9.93 23.99 30.58
0.50 2.39 0.00 2.22 0.00 3.33 9.57 2.97 12.50 20.04
0.75 8.50 2.45 0.00 2.74 0.00 2.37 0.00 2.91 8.64
Table A.2: Distributable surplus (% of income) with reference bundle g = (1, 0)
α11 α
1
1 α
1
1
——————————– ——————————– ——————————–
α12 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.25 0.50 0.75
ω12 = 0.25 ω
1
2 = 0.25 ω
1
2 = 0.25
ω21 = 0.75 ω
1
2 = 0.50 ω
1
2 = 0.25
0.25 8.64 2.91 0.00 2.50 0.00 2.66 0.00 2.22 6.89
0.50 20.04 12.50 2.97 10.99 3.33 0.00 2.45 0.00 2.46
0.75 30.58 23.99 9.93 21.26 11.24 2.48 8.50 2.39 0.00
ω12 = 0.50 ω
1
2 = 0.50 ω
1
2 = 0.50
ω21 = 0.75 ω
1
2 = 0.50 ω
1
2 = 0.25
0.25 2.37 0.00 2.74 0.00 3.21 11.09 2.37 9.57 17.99
0.50 9.57 3.33 0.00 3.21 0.00 3.29 0.00 3.33 11.48
0.75 17.99 11.48 2.61 11.09 3.29 0.00 2.74 0.00 2.61
ω12 = 0.75 ω
1
2 = 0.75 ω
1
2 = 0.75
ω21 = 0.75 ω
1
2 = 0.50 ω
1
2 = 0.25
0.25 0.00 2.45 8.50 2.50 10.99 21.26 8.64 20.04 30.58
0.50 2.22 0.00 2.39 0.00 3.33 11.24 2.91 12.50 23.99
0.75 6.89 2.46 0.00 2.66 0.00 2.48 0.00 2.97 9.93
Table A.3: Boiteux’ distributable income surplus
α11 α
1
1 α
1
1
——————————– ——————————– ——————————–
α12 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.25 0.50 0.75
ω12 = 0.25 ω
1
2 = 0.25 ω
1
2 = 0.25
ω21 = 0.75 ω
1
2 = 0.50 ω
1
2 = 0.25
0.25 26.27 13.40 3.00 2.62 0.00 2.78 0.00 2.41 8.91
0.50 12.21 3.41 0.00 12.21 3.41 0.00 2.53 0.00 2.53
0.75 42.26 26.27 10.11 24.47 11.65 2.50 8.91 2.41 0.00
ω12 = 0.50 ω
1
2 = 0.50 ω
1
2 = 0.50
ω21 = 0.75 ω
1
2 = 0.50 ω
1
2 = 0.25
0.25 11.65 3.41 0.00 0.00 3.33 12.26 2.50 11.65 24.47
0.50 3.33 0.00 3.33 3.33 0.00 3.33 0.00 3.41 12.21
0.75 24.47 12.21 2.62 12.26 3.33 0.00 2.78 0.00 2.62
ω12 = 0.75 ω
1
2 = 0.75 ω
1
2 = 0.75
ω21 = 0.75 ω
1
2 = 0.50 ω
1
2 = 0.25
0.25 2.41 0.00 2.41 2.62 12.21 24.47 10.11 26.27 42.26
0.50 0.00 3.41 11.65 0.00 3.41 11.65 3.00 13.40 26.27
0.75 8.91 2.53 0.00 2.78 0.00 2.50 0.00 3.00 10.11
Appendix 2
Description of the CGE models
In this paper, we use a CGE model for each of the seven countries considered. Each
CGE model is multisectoral3 and considers a representative household. The models are
calibrated using the 2005 input-output tables provided by OECD and other macro data
concerning national accounts. In order to take into account the effects of the recent crisis
on the possibility of surplus extraction, the CGE models are also calibrated using the
2009 data from national accounts and assuming the same structure for input-output.
Each sector produces one good using labor, capital and intermediate goods according
to a two-stage CES production function. In the first stage, the production level depends
on primary factors and total intermediate good and, in the second stage, the total in-
termediate good depends on the intermediate goods produced by the other sectors. The
production is sold in the domestic market or exported, where exports depend on the rel-
ative foreign/domestic price. The production that is sold in the domestic market and the
quantity imported are assumed to be imperfect substitutes according to the Armington
assumption and constitute a composite good that is sold to the firms as intermediate
good, to the representative household, to the government, or used as an investment good.
We consider one representative household who earns labor and capital incomes, trans-
fers from the government and interests on the public debt, and pays direct taxes. We
assume that an exogenous fraction of the disposable income is saved and the complemen-
tary fraction is consumed. The representative household maximizes his utility given a
budget constraint by choosing the optimal quantity of goods demanded for each sector.
We assume that the representative households has CES preferences
Concerning the budget constraint of the government, the difference between the total
expenditure (for goods demanded, transfers to households and interests on the public
debt) and the total revenue (direct and indirect taxation) determines the government
deficit. We discuss the fiscal rule in the next section.
The equilibrium of the balance of payments is guaranteed by capital inflows or out-
flows that are endogenously determined while the exchange rate is exogenously fixed. In
contrast, for the United Kingdom, capital inflows are fixed while the exchange rate is
endogenously determined in order to equilibrate the balance of payments.
We use the neoclassical macro closure implying that investments are determined by
aggregate savings, i.e. private and public savings and international capital flows.
We assume that all markets clear. For each sector, the domestic price adjusts in
order to equalize the quantity produced and demanded (domestic and foreign). The
real wage adjusts in order to equalize the total labor demanded by the sectors and the
(exogenous) labor supplied by the representative household. Similarly, the real rate of
capital remuneration adjusts in order to equalize the total capital demanded by the sectors
and the (exogenous) capital supplied by the representative household.
The seven CGE models are solved separately by considering the producer price index
as the numeraire.
3In our models we consider 16 sectors, reported in Table A.4.
Table A.4: List of the sectors in the CGE models
1 Agriculture
2 Food products
3 Textile
4 Oil and extraction industry
5 Mineral products
6 Metallurgy
7 Electric industry
8 Mechanic industry
9 Energy
10 Construction
11 Transports
12 Communications
13 Financial services
14 Non-financial services and R&D
15 Public administration
16 Other services
Fiscal rules
The government budget constraint can be written as:
D = G+ Γ + r ·B −
(∑
i
τV Ai · V Ai +
∑
i
τprodi · Yi + τY · Y
)
where D represents public deficit, G total government expenditure for goods and services,
Γ transfers to families, r ·B interests paid on the public debt, τV Ai VAT rate differentiated
by sector i, τprodi tax rate on product i, and τY income tax rate. The government can set
any of the following variables (except one): the deficit, the total expenditure, the transfers
to households, the income tax rate, the VAT rates and the tax rates on products. We
do not consider as instruments transfers, VAT rates and tax rates on products and we
consider the following five fiscal rules.
In the first fiscal rule, the government deficit and the income tax rate are exoge-
nous and fixed at the initial level (D = D0 and τY = τY0), while the total government
expenditure (G) is endogenously determined in order to satisfy the budget constraint.
In the second fiscal rule, the government deficit is exogenous and fixed at the initial
level (D = D0), the total government expenditure per worker is kept constant (
G
L
= α)
and the income tax rate (τY ) is endogenously determined in order to satisfy the budget
constraint.
In the third fiscal rule, the ratio between the government deficit and GDP is fixed at
the initial level ( D
GDP
= β), the income tax rate is exogenous (τY = τY0) and the total
government expenditure (G) is endogenously determined in order to satisfy the budget
constraint.
In the fourth fiscal rule, the ratio between the government deficit and GDP is fixed
at the initial level ( D
GDP
= β), the total government expenditure is exogenous (G = G0)
and the income tax rate (τY ) is endogenously determined in order to satisfy the budget
constraint.
In the fifth fiscal rule, the total government expenditure and the income tax rate
are exogenous (G = G0 and τY = τY0) and the government deficit (D) is endogenously
determined in order to satisfy the budget constraint.
Reference bundle
In our analysis we consider two reference bundles. In the first case, we consider the
equilibrium consumption bundle of the representative household. In the second case, we
rather use the disposable income as the reference unit.
